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Abstract
Preˆt a` Voter is an electronic voting system with
very high security properties. We aim to make the
system truly usable and applicable in elections with
many races and candidates by allowing the vote to
be formed using a voting machine and printing a
minimalistic receipt.
We also introduce the procedure/technology mix
concept to describe the use of procedures, peo-
ple and technology to secure electronic voting sys-
tems.
1 Introduction
Implementing Preˆt a` Voter as it is described in a se-
ries of papers [26, 8, 30, 31, 33, 29, 19, 20, 38, 18] has
an associated set of fairly hard problems not envis-
aged by the authors, such as reliable optical charac-
ter recognition (OCR), multi-page ballot forms in
elections where there are many candidates contend-
ing many different races, chain of custody issues
relating to pre-printed ballot forms, key distribu-
tion problems relating to on-demand printed ballot
forms and so forth.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians and
civil servants, in Europe and probably around the
world, are concerned with the accessibility and ap-
plicability of electronic voting systems to a higher
degree and cutting-edge security technology to a
lesser degree than seemingly realised by researchers
in the electronic voting field. Consider for example
the impossibility for a civil servant in a country in
continental Europe where there may, for example,
be 28 candidates in each of seven races contended
on the same ballot form to implement Preˆt a` Voter
2005 or 2006 — the ballot form is simply too large
to be scanned.
Further anecdotal evidence suggests that a ma-
jor contributor to decisions to use electronic voting
in Europe is to simplify the process. For exam-
ple when the City of Hamburg, Germany, changed
its electoral law it almost became a necessity to use
some form of electronic counting of the votes as this
would take days and weeks to do by hand [36]. The
decision was taken to implement a completely new
system based on Anoto pens and although this sys-
tem was very accessible and had some procedures
to safeguard the accuracy of the election, it seems
it lacked sufficient technical guarantees of this.
We suggest that when implementing a real-world
electronic voting system it is necessary to, to some
degree, use the age old accessibility measurement
“would my grandmother understand how to vote”.
Please note that we do not suggest that the grand-
mother in question necessarily understands what
technology, procedures and cryptography propa-
gate and secure the vote, but we do suggest that
she understands how to cast her vote and that she
be not unnecessarily alarmed by some feature of
the electronic voting system and as a consequence
starts to doubt the secrecy of her vote.
This paper proposes a configuration of the Preˆt
a` Voter electronic voting system in its later guises
with emphasis on usability, accessibility and sim-
plicity.
1.1 Overview
This paper consists of three main parts: Section 2
shows the importance of end-to-end verifiable elec-
tronic voting systems and introduces the proce-
dure/technology mix; Section 3 introduces the con-
tribution of this paper; Sectionsec:technical con-
tains the technical details.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we describe the properties of end-
to-end verifiable systems and introduce the proce-
dure/technology concept.
2.1 End-to-end verifiability
The will to elect leaders and representatives stem
from a mass of people, equal, who have organised
and created states and institutions to serve the pop-
ulation. From this philosophical point of view some
may say that once leaders were first democratically
elected, they created election authorities and thus
these are trustworthy and able to run fair elections
for the people. Others are more reluctant to place
such trust with such authorities. Consider for ex-
ample some of those states in the world today that
wish to disguise an undemocratic rule by holding
general elections — that are unfair. The most ef-
fective weapon against this at the disposal of the
world’s truly democratic nations is election obser-
vation.
However, election observation is a very blunt in-
strument with tremendous organisational and bud-
getary requirements. Although essential, election
observation can only function as an audit of the
procedures in place to safeguard the election and
it is impossible to know, or prove, that the audit
is sufficiently complete to allow conclusions to be
drawn about the secrecy and fairness of the elec-
tion.
This suggests that it would be more beneficial,
if it was possible, to audit the election as a whole
rather than some subset of the procedures involved.
The ability to audit the whole election and (perhaps
mathematically) prove that the outcome is exactly
as indicated by the voters on election day has been
given the name end-to-end verifiability and there
exist many systems aiming to do this [1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25]. There may be
other ways of achieving this but we consider end-to-
end verifiability a combination of two other: voter
verifiability and public verifiability.
Voter verifiability The voter is given a receipt
which she can use to check after the close of
the election that her vote has been included in
the tally. In order for the system to be coercion
resistant the receipt must not reveal the vote.
Public verifiability Any interested person or or-
ganisation can, perhaps using software, check
that all the encrypted receipts are properly de-
crypted into plain text votes and that these are
tallied correctly.
2.2 The procedure/technology mix
We confess that we would rather employ a techno-
logical solution to security issues in electronic vot-
ing systems than a procedural one, but here feel
obliged to introduce the procedure/technology mix.
This is simply the mix of technology, procedures
and people that constitutes any electronic voting
system.
In the previous section we claimed that the use of
end-to-end verifiability would render the auditing
of procedures and people obsolete. This is certainly
true regarding the correctness of the outcome of the
election, it is simply possible to prove whether the
reported outcome is correct or not and if not, find
the source of the error.
However, the secrecy of the election is, of course,
a kind of property that once leaked cannot be
“proven” back to secrecy. Furthermore, end-to-end
verifiability is unfortunately very hard to achieve
with technology only. Consider for example a the-
oretical system, the accuracy and secrecy of which
depends on each voting device having its own se-
cret private key. The distribution of these keys are
in fact a procedural solution to both the accuracy
and secrecy problems!
It therefore seems logical that the secrecy of the
election is safeguarded by some mix of technology
and procedures and we advocate a use of proce-
dures to increase the accessibility of the system
where a technological solution would reduce it.
2.3 Definitions
Web bulletin board To facilitate the verifiabil-
ity of the system a web bulletin board is used
to publish data at different steps throughout
the election process. The web bulletin board
is mostly seen as append-only, meaning that it
is not possible to remove information from it
[14]. Furthermore only some of those involved
in the system are able to write to it. The web
bulletin board is also where the voter goes to
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check that her vote has been included in the
final tally.
Teller A teller is a trusted party given the oppor-
tunity to take part in the running of the elec-
tion system by performing a shuﬄe. The trust
placed in a teller is not such that it would be
able to change the outcome of the election. In-
stead the probability that at least one teller
is honest is the mechanism safeguarding the
secrecy of the election. Thus it is important
to select a reasonable number of tellers such
that they represent sufficiently diverse inter-
ests. One way of selecting tellers would thus
be to use a number of political parties: the
probability that they would all work together
to change the outcome of the election should
therefore be small.
Clerk The clerks are involved in the setting up
of the ballot forms. It may be beneficial to
the security of the system to allow different
organisations to be clerks and tellers, but in
some cases it is possible for the tellers to fulfill
the duties of the clerks without compromising
the secrecy of the system.
Encrypted receipt The voter takes part in the
creation of the encrypted receipt and thus
knows that it encapsulates her vote. The voter
is allowed to retain the receipt and after the
close of the election she can check that it ap-
pears correctly on the web bulletin board, thus
verifying the inclusion of her vote in the final
tally. As the receipt is encrypted it does not
reveal the vote it encapsulates and therefore
cannot be used to coerce the voter or by the
voter to prove to a vote buyer how she voted.
Coercer A coercer attempts to influence a voter
to vote in a particular way (or spoil her vote or
abstend from voting) by threat or reward. An
electronic voting system is coercion resistant if
it is possible for the voter to vote however she
wishes without the coercer being able to check
or find out whether she has complied with his
request or not.
3 Simpler Preˆt a` Voter
3.1 Motivation
From our work with the first Preˆt a` Voter imple-
mentation and the subsequent demonstrations have
resulted in the identification of two main problems
impeding the progress toward the running of a gen-
eral election:
1. OCR. TheOptical Character Recognition
(OCR) used in the first version of the sys-
tem was not very robust and in order to in-
terpret the marks as successfully as possible,
it required the voter to use a seven segment
display (like those you see in LED clocks) and
a thick pen. Although all agreed that the suc-
cess rate of the OCR can be increased there
was strong opposition from those with particu-
lar experience of implementing voting schemes
against the seven segment display. It was felt
that these were too cumbersome and hard to
understand. We realise that this is not accept-
able in a general election as such a voting sys-
tem is used rarely by voters and this would
introduce a large proportion of errors.
2. Scanning. The sheet-feed scanning of the bal-
lot form is evidently very hard to use in elec-
tions where there are a number of races and/or
a large number of candidates — election law
may also stipulate that all races and candi-
dates are printed on a single sheet, making
this sheet immensely large. Furthermore, the
layout of the ballot form would require that
all candidates and their “boxes” were printed
along the vertical axis of the paper, further
limiting the number of races and candidates
that can be printed on any piece of paper. Un-
fortunately, although that version of the Preˆt a`
Voter implementation did support many con-
current different ballot forms it did not sup-
port the spanning of a single race over more
than one ballot form.
The motivation for this configuration of Preˆt a`
Voter is thus simplicity, accessibility and the ac-
commodation of very large number of candidates.
As the reader will see in the following sections this
introduces some procedural safeguards where tech-
nological safeguards have previously been envis-
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aged [34, 29]. We argue that this is not only neces-
sary but that it is so important to include as many
voters and introduce as few errors as possible in the
voting process that the procedure/technology mix
must be adjusted.
3.2 The voting ceremony
In the polling station there are a certain number of
voting machines placed in voting booths. The se-
crecy of the election is based on these voting booths
providing proper privacy to the voter and the vot-
ing machine similarly being unable to leak the in-
tention of the voter. Thus there are poll station
workers and guards keeping the area under surveil-
lance in order to ensure that the machines cannot
be tampered with1.
The voter is able to enter the polling station
without first identifying herself to the poll station
staff and she can enter a voting booth so as to inter-
act with the voting machine. It is important that
she is not required to identify herself before she
can interact with the machine because this makes
it harder for the poll station staff or machine to
connect the will expressed in the interaction with
the machine to a particular voter.
The main purpose of the voting machine is to
help the voter express her will in the election, the
difficulty of which depends on the election system
in place and the abilities of the voter. As the voter
is interacting with a computer to make her choices
the accessibility of the system is in itself an impor-
tant area of research. It thus serves little use to go
further into the details of how the voter interacts
with the system to indicate her choices and it is
sufficient to say that she may do so using her sight,
touch and/or hearing and a touch screen, mouse,
voice or other input device(s). At the end of the in-
teraction the voting machine prints a vote in plain
text (see Section 4.5) which the voter takes away
and casts.
Interacting with the machine in the voting booth
the voter is able to produce some number of votes.
This must be a number greater than one so that
the voter is able to create one vote that correctly
captures her intention and some number of other
votes that she can choose to audit, see below. The
1Note that the accuracy is not threatened by this leak of
information: but the privacy of the election is.
voting machine does therefore not know whether
a vote it helps to construct will be audited or if
it will be cast. It should therefore be disinclined
to cheat because there is some likelihood that it
will be found out and taken out of commission. In
order to stop voters from occupying voting booths
too long and stopping others from voting, election
law may stipulate some maximum number of votes
such as five or ten, which would be quite sufficient
for the purpose.
When the receipt is printed by the machine the
voter can read it through and ensure that it is the
vote she indicated to the machine. The vote she
is going to cast she turns into an encrypted re-
ceipt (see below). Any or all of the other votes
she may have created she is able to have audited
by approaching an auditing desk. The barcodes on
these ballot forms are scanned in by poll station
workers and the forms are decrypted and the infor-
mation printed. The voter is now able to check that
the printed information does correspond to the vote
she has just audited. If so, she will grow more con-
fident that the vote she will submit is also correctly
formed.
Finally the voter approaches a submission desk
with the encrypted receipt she wishes to submit.
She identifies herself to poll station workers and
the barcode on the encrypted receipt is scanned
and the contents of it is electronically submitted to
a central repository (and may be noted next to the
name of the voter who has cast it). Note that no
submitted data must be kept secret to safeguard
the secrecy of the election: it is already encrypted.
After the close of the election, this, and all other
encrypted receipts, will be decrypted as described
in Section 4.8.
The voter can now leave the poll station with her
encrypted receipt and after the close of the election
she can use a website to check for the inclusion
of her vote in the tally. She does this by enter-
ing the serial number of her encrypted receipt and
comparing the image of the receipt served by the
website with the actual receipt. If the marks on
these match exactly she can be confident that her
vote is included in the tally.
4
4 Technical foundation
4.1 Coping with Single Transferable
Vote
In order to support Single Transferable Vote (STV)
[37, 35] and other schemes where the voter ex-
presses a ranking or awards votes to more than one
candidate we employ the multiple-onion approach
introduced by [13]. We provide an overview of the
scheme here.
A numerical representation of a candidate is en-
crypted under a probabilistic threshold public key
cryptography scheme. There are many different
such encryptions for each candidate and as these
are encrypted under a probabilistic scheme they do
not look alike. We call these encryptions onions. A
set of onions are associated with each ballot form
and the voter’s choices, as expressed on the bal-
lot form, are translated into an ordering of these
onions. If the voter wishes to cast a vote for the
candidates in the order C, E, A, D, B then this is
encoded by ordering the constituent onions thus:
OC , OE , OA, OD, OB , Ostop
Note that these are encryptions and which can-
didate they represent is therefore hidden. The stop
onion Ostop is used to ensure that the length of the
vote is not dependent on the number of choices ex-
pressed by the voter. A vote only for candidate C,
for example, is thus constituted by an onion OC ,
the stop onion and thereafter all other onions in a
random order:
OC , Ostop, OA, OE , OD, OB
After the close of the election the first constituent
onion of each cast vote is decrypted and the vote
given to the indicated candidate. This initiates the
applicable STV protocol which removes candidates
and redistribute the votes according to the next
choice in order in a number of rounds until the
required number of candidates have been elected.
Each time the vote is redistributed the next choice
is decrypted. In our example the first candidate is
decrypted thus:
C,OE , OA, OD, OB , Ostop
If candidate C is subsequently eliminated and his
or her votes redistributed, the onion representing
candidate C is appended, the plaintext representa-
tion of C removed and the next onion decrypted,
thus:
E,OA, OD, OB , Ostop, OC
This is now a vote for E. When a decryption
reveals the stop onion the vote is removed from
further redistributions. Each redistribution round
contains a re-encryption shuﬄe so as to hide the
ordering of the candidates in the vote, please see
[13] for details. This configuration thus limits the
impact of an attack popularly called the Italian at-
tack [13] where the ordering of the candidates car-
ries some message to a coercer.
4.2 Pre-creation of onions
A source of potential threats to the secrecy of the
election pointed out in early papers describing end-
to-end verifiable systems [26, 6, 30, 16, 31, 33, 32,
27, 28] was that the voting machine must select
random values and errors or predictability in the
pseudo-random number generator may render the
cryptography useless. Furthermore, the voting ma-
chine might use “random” values from a list shared
with a culprit or values such that a hash thereof
would signal to a culprit the contents of the vote
and/or the identity of the voter. To remove this
problem we do not require the machine to select
the randomness used in creating the candidate list.
The ballot form pre-creation process is started
before the the election by a set of clerks (as de-
scribed in [33]). In order to incorporate the STV
strategy introduced above, the first clerk sets up
two sets of onions, OL and OR (the candidates are
listed in the base/alphabetical order) for each bal-
lot form:
OL OR
OLA ORA
OLB ORB
OLC ORC
OLD ORD
OLE ORE
OR is encrypted under the public threshold key
of the tellers and OL under the public key of a par-
ticular voting machine (see below). Thus OLA and
ORA contain the same plaintext but are encrypted
under different public keys, meaning that the vot-
ing machine alone can decrypt OL and a threshold
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set of tellers must work together to decrypt OR.
The pair is denoted thus:
(EPKM (OL), EPKT (OR))
As a probabilistic encryption scheme such as El-
Gamal [10] or Paillier [23] is used, it is possible to
change the appearance of the encryption by inject-
ing randomness into the encryption without chang-
ing the plaintext. We take advantage of this prop-
erty in the next step in which we wish to ensure
that no-one knows the order of the candidates in
OL or OR.
The following procedure is now performed by
each clerk in turn. One after the other, an onion
pair (OL, OR) is taken by the clerk from the web
bulletin board. The order of the constituent onions
is now permuted by the clerk based on a random
value that it selects2. The clerk stores this random
value in its internal database3 to be used for audit-
ing at a later stage. For example the order of the
constituent onions may now be:
OL OR
OLC ORC
OLB ORB
OLE ORE
OLD ORD
OLA ORA
Note that each OLx and ORx still correspond.
In order to hide the re-ordering performed by the
clerk, it injects randomness into the encryption of
each constituent onion. This randomness is also
stored in the clerk’s internal database. This process
is called to re-encrypt the onions and results in a set
of constituent onions that cannot be related to the
previous set without first performing a decryption,
in our example:
O′L O
′
R
O′LC O
′
RC
O′LB O
′
RB
O′LE O
′
RE
O′LD O
′
RD
O′LA O
′
RA
2The clerk can choose this value however it wants: the
secrecy of the system is based on a number of clerks perform-
ing this operation and thus if at least one clerk is honest the
secrecy is safeguarded
3Each clerk must keep its database secret, but the se-
crecy of the system is only jeapordised if all clerks leak their
databases.
The clerk now writes (O′L, O
′
R) to a new column,
its middle column, on the web bulletin board. The
process is repeated on (O′L, O
′
R) and (O
′′
L, O
′′
R) is
written to a third column, the clerk’s output col-
umn.
The whole process is now repeated by each clerk
in order for all (OL, OR) pairs on the web bulletin
board, as shown in Table 1. The result of this
process is a final column containing (OL, OR) pairs
where the order of the constituent onions are un-
known to all parties and can only be found out if
all clerks collude or a decryption is performed.
4.3 On-demand distribution
As stated previously the purpose of creating the
onions before the election is to ensure that no sin-
gle entity has undue influence over their creation.
In order to make use of the onions, however, they
must be distributed to the polling stations and vot-
ing machines. The foundation of this distribution
is the assignment of a private key to each electronic
voting machine. It follows logically that this private
(secret) key must be loaded into the machine and it
must be ensured that it cannot be extracted from
the machine. It is thus plain that the secrecy of the
election is based on safe and secure creation, distri-
bution and use of private/public key pairs. This is
normally called a Private Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Furthermore the voting machines may require the
use of some elements of tamper-proof hardware to
ensure that no covert channels, leaking the choices
made by the voter (very much like a camera in the
voting booth would), exist. We do not cover these
topics in this paper.
As discussed in the introduction, we are here opt-
ing for a procedure/technology mix with higher em-
phasis on procedural solutions than may have been
employed in previous schemes. One such procedu-
ral solution is the use of a PKI as described above.
When the voter interacts with the voting ma-
chine (see next section) the machine requires the
OL set of onions to produce a vote. There are two
ways of distributing these onions to the voting ma-
chine: either using a network (Internet) connection
or by pre-loading a batch of onions.
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No Setup Clerk 1 Clerk 2 Clerk 3
1 (OL, OR) (O′L, O
′
R) (O
′′
L, O
′′
R) (O
′′′
L , O
′′′
R ) (O
4
L, O
4
R) (O
5
L, O
5
R) (O
5
L, O
6
R)
2
3
...
Table 1: The pre-creation web bulletin board
4.3.1 Network connection
If the voting machine is equipped with a network
connection and it is able to connect to a central
repository over this network, it can fetch the re-
quired onions on demand. The main disadvan-
tage to this approach is that the network connec-
tion must be made as secure as possible but can
be used to carry covert communication by a tam-
pered/infected machine to an accomplice. As the
running of the election is based on the availability
of the network and the servers on this network this
makes the system arguably fragile.
The main advantage to this on-demand distri-
bution is that if the clerks are online during the
election phase they are able to create any number
of onions as required by the machines. This means
that only the exact number of onions required has
to be created which reduces storage demands etc.
4.3.2 Pre-loading of batch
Before the election, as described in the previous
section, the clerks create a certain, large, number
of onions for each voting machine. These onions
are then stored on some mobile media (hard drive,
flash drive, CD or DVD etc) and transported to
the polling stations and loaded into the appropri-
ate machines. The foremost advantage of this setup
is that no network is required to run the election,
eliminating an arguably very fragile part of the sys-
tem. Furthermore, if no network is required then
the machine in the voting booth becomes fully au-
tonomous.
The main disadvantage of course is that a very
large number of onions must be created by the
clerks in advance and distributed “by hand” and
when a voting machine runs out of onions it may
be a lengthy process to replenish its store.
We include both these options here to show that
the system is quite adaptable to the particular cir-
cumstances under which it is used. Note that the
voting machine has no need to communicate with
the outside world, only to receive prepared onions
from the clerks.
4.4 Touch screen interface
To accommodate for elections with many races
and/or races with many candidates the proposed
configuration of Preˆt a` Voter has two major differ-
ences to previous versions: (a) the receipt is created
by a voting machine and (b) the receipt is printed
in the minimal form presented in the next section.
4.4.1 Preparing the machine
Before the voting machine can be used it must be
loaded with the definition of the election, its races
and their candidates. This is a detail of the im-
plementation and as such is not defined in detail
here: the scheme presented here only requires the
machine to be loaded with this information in ad-
vance of its use. This means this scheme is com-
patible with many different scenarios, from a single
election with a number of races where all voters are
able to cast (a) vote(s) to constituency based vot-
ing where a may only be eligible to vote in a subset
of all the defined races.
4.4.2 Creating a vote with the machine
This is an example of a possible interaction with the
voting machine. The steps involved can be different
in appearance, order and number and are adapted
to the election.
Approaching an idle voting machine, the voter
is greeted with a message asking her to touch the
screen to initiate the voting process.
Springfield Local Election
Tap screen to start
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A list of races is shown with indicators to whether
or not a vote has been created in each race. The
voter selects a race by tapping the screen4.
Select race
Mayor Not voted
Sanitation Commissioner Not voted
A list of the candidates in the selected race is
shown and the voter is able to tap a single can-
didate or a number of candidates in the preferred
order. A “Clear” button is available on the screen,
which clears all choices made and allows the voter
to start over. A “Proceed” button allows the voter
to return to the list of races.
Vote for Sanitation Commissioner
Shmoikel Krustofsky
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson
Homer Simpson
Selecting her favourite candidate, the voter com-
pletes the vote for the race and clicks the “Proceed”
button to return to the race selection screen.
Select race
Mayor Not voted
Sanitation Commissioner Voted
The voter is able to return to any race and re-
create her vote. A “Proceed” button on the race se-
lection screen allows her to go to a summary screen.
Here the voter can select either of two buttons: “Go
back” or “Print vote”.
Summary of your vote
Mayor Not voted
Sanitation Commissioner Homer Simpson
When the voter is finished and presses the “Print
vote” button, the machine displays a final message
whilst printing the vote.
Thank you
Please take your printed vote
4Or using some other input method, depending on the
abilities of the voter.
4.5 The minimalistic encrypted re-
ceipt
The purpose of the minimalistic encrypted receipt
is to enable the printing of many races on the same
receipt and to aid the voter in checking the receipt
on the web bulletin board. To achieve this we wish
to print as few candidates as possible on the vote.
We first introduce the traditional Preˆt a` Voter bal-
lot form and its associated encrypted receipt before
showing the alterations we propose to these.
4.5.1 The Preˆt a` Voter ballot form and en-
crypted receipt
The ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter consists of two
columns: in the left the candidates are printed in a
random order (based on randomness unique for the
form) and in the right the voter makes her marks
in a grid corresponding to the candidates in the left
column. For example:
Ballot form
Sanitation Commissioner
Homer Simpson
STOP
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson
Shmoikel Krustofsky
lk3j92784
If a voter makes her marks in the right hand side
grid and then detaches and destroys the left hand
column, the remaining encrypted receipt does not
reveal her vote. However, a value called the onion,
printed at the bottom of the grid, can be decrypted
to reveal the vote. In this example an encrypted
receipt may be:
2
3
1
lk3j92784
It has been envisaged that the Preˆt a` Voter is a
single page, which contains all races in the election
and all the candidates in each of those races. The
voter makes her mark on the paper and detaches
and destroys half, producing an encrypted receipt
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which is subsequently scanned and then handled
electronically. It is quite clear that in an election
with many races and many candidates, it is not
possible to print all on one piece of paper that can
also be fed through a scanner after the marks have
been made by the voter.
4.5.2 The minimalistic encrypted receipt
The traditional Preˆt a` Voter ballot form is printed
onto paper before the election (or on demand be-
fore they are used [33, 18]) and as the voter uses a
pen to fill out her choices, naturally all candidates
must be available on the ballot form. In the scheme
presented here a computer is used to create the vote
after which the ballot form is printed. Therefore, it
is possible to print only the candidate(s) that the
voter has indicated a vote for.
In our example, when the voter makes her marks
using the touch screen she may indicate her choices
thus (note that the candidates are listed in the al-
phabetical order on the screen):
Vote for Sanitation Commissioner
Shmoikel Krustofsky
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson 1
Homer Simpson 2
When the voter presses the “Print receipt” but-
ton the voting machine retrieves the necessary
onions and decrypts these (see above) to find the
ordering of the candidates. Let us assume in our
example that the machine retrieves the onions with
serial number 27344, decrypts these and finds that
the candidate list has the following order:
27344
Homer Simpson
STOP
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson
Shmoikel Krustofsky
The machine now prints the following filled-out
Preˆt a` Voter ballot form, note that only the can-
didates which the voter has indicated are printed
and that these are printed in the order dictated by
the onions:
Ballot form
Sanitation Commissioner
Homer Simpson 2
STOP 3
Ray Patterson 1
1, 2, 4
27344
In this example we are only able to avoid print-
ing two candidates, but in a race with many more
candidates the same number of choices made by
the voter would drastically reduce the number of
candidates that must be printed. The index num-
bers 1, 2, 4 of the candidates printed are displayed
at the bottom right together with the serial num-
ber 27344. These values can be printed in the form
of a barcode (see below) which allows them to be
read in quickly. Note that these numbers together
with the choices indicated above by the voter is all
that is needed to represent the vote.
The voter now checks that the printed vote is
truly a representation of her intended vote. If it
is not she can discard the vote (by shredding it for
example) and produce another. If she is happy with
the vote and wishes to cast it, she detaches the two
columns from each other and destroys the left hand
one. What remains is an encrypted receipt:
2
3
1
1, 2, 4
27344
The voter approaches a desk manned by poll sta-
tion staff, identifies herself and allows the barcode
on the encrypted receipt to be scanned. When poll
station staff are satisfied that the barcode has been
scanned and electronically transmitted to the web
bulletin board they stamp the encrypted receipt
with an official stamp so as to indicate that it is
the receipt of a vote that has been cast in the elec-
tion. A mark is placed in the register to indicate
that this voter has cast her vote5.
All votes submitted in this way are collected on
the web bulletin board.
5In some constituencies, such as the United Kingdom,
the law requires that the ballot form serial number is noted
against the name of the voter: that is quite possible to do
in this scheme.
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4.5.3 The barcode
All previous versions of Preˆt a` Voter has required
an encrypted receipt to be scanned in and inter-
preted to form a digital representation that could
subsequently be decrypted. This OCR process has
been shown to be a significant weakness to the
scheme: it results in many errors6.
In this scheme we reduce the amount of work in
the scanning process to the recognition of a bar-
code. These are printed in such a way as to be
simple to read and recognise and they can contain
check numbers etc to aid the correct interpretation
of them.
In order to record a vote the system must read
the following information from the encrypted re-
ceipt:
1. The serial number (27344)
2. Which candidates are shown on the ballot form
(1, 2, 4)
3. The marks made by the voter (2, 3, 1)
To enter this information into the barcode, we
simply concatenate them:
27344|1, 2, 4|2, 3, 1
When this information is scanned by poll station
staff it is submitted to the web bulletin board. Here
the appropriate constituent onions are retrieved:
27344
ORSimpson
ORSTOP
ORNahasapeemapetilon
ORPatterson
ORKrustofsky
The appropriate onions are selected (numbers 1,
2 and 4 in our example) and re-ordered in the cor-
rect order as indicated by the choices (2, 3 and 1)
— thus the onions are placed in the following order:
27344
ORPatterson
ORSimpson
ORSTOP
6Note that these errors did not mean that a vote was cast
for a different candidate than indicated by the voter — but
that the vote had to fill out another ballot form as the first
could not be correctly understood by the system.
Note that of course the contents of these onions
are unknown! Therefore the system now holds an
encrypted vote submitted by this voter.
4.6 Auditing a vote
We here argue that it is safe to allow a voter to use
a voting machine to create the vote, because she
may create any number of votes and audit some of
these. If the voting machine attempts to cheat it
cannot be sure that the vote will not be audited
and its cheating thus found out. A malfunctioning
machine will thus be found with a high probability
and taken out of commission.
The first audit that a voter does of a vote printed
by the voting machine is simply to read it. If
the machine has committed an error (or something
worse) then the marks printed would not match the
intention of the voter. If this is the case she can
simply destroy the vote and create another one —
until she receives one that correctly indicates the
vote she wishes to cast. Note that the voter may
have performed some “human” error while inter-
acting with the machine and not spotted this until
the vote has been printed: this gives her another
chance to spot such a mistake and to rectify it.
The second audit of the ballot form that can be
performed on any vote is the checking of the bar-
code. This is simply done by the voter allowing the
barcode to be scanned by a machine available in
the polling station which shows the contents of the
barcode in a human readable form. Such machines
can also be supplied by independent organisations.
The voter then simply checks that the information
shown by the reader corresponds to the information
printed in the right column of her vote.
Finally, if the voter decides to audit a created
vote7 then the constituent onions OR shall be re-
trieved from the web bulletin board (where they are
marked as audited, ensuring that no vote can sub-
sequently be cast with these onions) and decrypted
by the tellers. The full candidate list is then dis-
played to the voter who compares it to the printed
vote.
The purpose of this audit is first to find any ma-
chine that may malfunction or that has been com-
promised. Secondly the audit functions to convince
7Note that the voter can print any number of votes and
therefore she can create a vote with completely different
choices to the vote she subsequently intends to cast.
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voters that the system is working correctly and that
the vote will be decrypted correctly.
4.7 Checking the receipt
The voter is allowed to take home the scanned and
stamped encrypted receipt. She can then, at any
time, visit the web bulletin board on the web and
search for the serial number printed on the receipt.
When she calls up her receipt she should see an
exact replica of the receipt she holds in her hands.
If this is the case then the voter can be certain that
her vote has been included in the final tally. If the
receipt is not found on the web bulletin board or if
the version she finds there does not match the one
she has in her hand, she can accuse those in charge
of running the election of malfunction or fraud and
she has proof in her receipt that she has cast a vote
which is now missing or has been changed.
4.8 Decryption and tallying
At this stage the web bulletin board contains a list
of all encrypted votes that have been cast, in the
form of a number of ordered onions. A detailed
specification of how the decryption is performed is
available in [13] but we provide an overview here.
As shown in the pre-creation of the onions
(Section 4.2) the appearance of the onions can
be changed without altering the plaintext hidden
within. We make use of this same method to break
the link between the encrypted receipt (and thus
the voter) and the plaintext vote. This is achieved
by allowing the tellers to perform a number of re-
encryption mixes before decrypting the onions and
starting the STV protocol.
An example re-encryption mix network for a
mere three votes is shown in Table 2. Each teller
reads all votes on the web bulletin board as a batch,
performs two re-encryption mixes and writes each
of the resulting batches to the web bulletin board.
When a threshold set of the tellers have satisfied
themselves that the votes are thoroughly mixed,
they perform the threshold decryption of the first
constituent onion of all votes in the final batch.
These partially decrypted votes go into the first
round of the STV algorithm.
4.9 Note on securing the machine
using procedures
It is important to note that the accuracy of the
election, that is to say the trustworthiness of the
outcome of the election, is safeguarded not by pro-
cedures but by the cryptographic properties of the
system. The result of the election is thus as trust-
worthy as in previous configurations of Preˆt a` Voter
[8, 33], because they all rely on the same verifiabil-
ity.
4.10 Summary
In this section we have shown how a pre-existing
technique of coping safely with STV can be used in
this scheme, how a typical interaction with the vot-
ing machine may look, the minimalistic encrypted
receipt and how the voter checks that her vote is
included and how the system is audited.
5 Discussion
The main advantages of the proposed scheme is
that the voting machine is able to guide the voter
through a potentially very complex voting proce-
dure involving any number of races and any number
of candidates in those races. The voter turns the
plain text vote into an encrypted receipt and the
scanning of this receipt is very fast because only a
barcode has to be scanned.
The main disadvantage to this configuration of
Preˆt a` Voter is that the voting machine must learn
the voter’s intention in order to produce the receipt.
The secrecy of the election is thus safeguarded sim-
ply by procedures that ensure that the machine
does not leak any information. As discussed in the
introductory sections of this paper there is a neces-
sity to alter the procedure/technology mix so that
it is possible to make the system more accessible
and remove a large proportion of the errors associ-
ated with the filling out of the ballot form.
5.1 Future work
The work on an implementation of the system de-
scribed in this paper is underway.
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Row Cast Teller 1 . . .
1. (OB , OA, OS , OC) (O′A, O
′
B , O
′
C , O
′
S) (O
′′
S , O
′′
A, O
′′
A, O
′′
C) . . .
2. (OS , OA, OA, OC) (O′B , O
′
A, O
′
S , O
′
C) (O
′′
A, O
′′
B , O
′′
C , O
′′
S) . . .
3. (OA, OB , OC , OS) (O′S , O
′
A, O
′
A, O
′
C) (O
′′
B , O
′′
A, O
′′
S , O
′′
C) . . .
...
Row Teller n Round 1
1. (O2n−1A , O
2n−1
B , O
2n−1
C , O
2n−1
S ) (O
2n
B , O
2n
A , O
2n
S , O
2n
C ) (B,O
2n
A , O
2n
S , O
2n
C )
2. (O2n−1S , O
2n−1
A , O
2n−1
A , O
2n−1
C ) (O
2n
S , O
2n
A , O
2n
A , O
2n
C ) (S,O
2n
A , O
2n
A , O
2n
C )
3. (O2n−1B , O
2n−1
A , O
2n−1
S , O
2n−1
C ) (O
2n
A , O
2n
B , O
2n
C , O
2n
S ) (A,O
2n
B , O
2n
C , O
2n
S )
...
Table 2: The re-encryption mixes of the encrypted votes
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